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Living in Interesting Times
The Economics of a Chinese Currency Attack
Jeffrey E. Haymond, Colonel, USAF
What really matters . . . is the strength of the currency. Britain has nu
clear weapons, but the pound is weak, so everyone pushes it around.
—John F. Kennedy

Several large near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, have
amassed large levels of dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves. This
raises concern that these states could deliberately sell off assets to harm the
dollar’s value. Currency attacks have historically been a part of warfare,
and the recent advent of nation-states that have large reserves suggests it
is possible the United States could face this threat. Contemporary public
discussion has often lacked depth and been at one of two extremes: either
(1) China could destroy the United States if it chose to sell off its treasuries,
or (2) the Chinese would lose so much they would never undertake a
currency attack. This article takes a detailed look at China’s economy to
determine the plausibility of a currency attack against the United States.
There are many conflating economic issues surrounding a currency at
tack, such as the perceived overvaluation of the dollar and its status as the
world’s primary reserve currency. The analysis herein suggests that large
dollar reserves are sufficient to enable a currency attack, independent of
the valuation of the dollar or its status as the world’s reserve currency. The
economic reasons for China to hold large foreign exchange reserves are
central to our conclusions; these are found to be independent of any mali
cious intent towards the US dollar.
A currency attack on the dollar is plausible, with possible devastating
effects if not effectively countered. However, an attack is extremely improb
able due to the costs an attacker would face and can be effectively countered

Col Jeffrey E. Haymond is currently vice-commander of the Space Development Test Wing at Kirtland
AFB, New Mexico. He researched the issue of currency attacks as an Air Force Fellow at the Brookings
Institution’s 21st Century Defense Initiative. Colonel Haymond holds a doctorate in economics from
George Mason University and has previously published research in monetary economics and the field of
public choice.
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with adequate preparations. Given the speed of modern financial markets,
these preparations must be made in advance; it is doubtful an ad hoc
response would be either a sufficient or an effective deterrent.
As Chinese imports to the United States have dramatically risen, the value
of China’s currency is increasingly contentious, with Congress periodically
threatening trade sanctions unless China’s currency, the renminbi (“people’s
currency”), is revalued.1 While the renminbi’s value is controversial due to
its alleged impact on US jobs and trade deficit, another currency issue is
emerging as perhaps even more serious: the large dollar-denominated re
serves held by China’s central bank, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC),
could be sold in an attack on the US dollar. China’s state media refer to
this as the “nuclear option,” and it has even President Bush talking. He is
not alone; the subject can yield over 2.5 million hits on Google.2 Yet find
ing a rigorous analysis is difficult; most discussions resort to a superficial
“that would never happen” or “China could destroy us.” This article ad
dresses that shortcoming by providing an economic review of a currency
attack and what can be done to prevent one.
Sterilization ensures that dollars coming into China do not lead to
inflation. As Chinese exporters receive dollars in exchange for goods,
they are required to deposit those with a state bank, which the PBOC
purchases with renminbi. To avoid the renminbi being used by the
banks as additional reserves (which would expand the money supply
and lead to inflation), the PBOC sells “sterilization” bonds to the
banks to soak up the excess liquidity. This process is used by many of
the Asian tigers to prevent their currencies from rising against the
dollar without creating widespread internal inflation.

The issues of currency manipulation and attack are related; the proc
ess of sterilization used by China to avoid currency appreciation leads the
PBOC to hold large dollar reserves, which could be used to attack the
value of the dollar. Chinese investment in dollar assets lowers US interest
rates but increases US dependence on foreigners.3 While Japan has held
large dollar reserves for quite some time, it is a US ally. The last decade’s
commodity boom and dramatic growth of East Asia, in concert with re
duced US savings, has driven near-peer competitors, such as Russia and
Strategic Studies Quar terly ♦ Winter 2008
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China, to acquire large dollar denominated foreign exchange (FX) reserves
as well. The dollar would be significantly pressured if China, Russia, or the
Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) countries decided to sell their dollar
FX reserves or sovereign wealth fund (SWF)4 dollar assets in favor of al
ternative reserves (euro, yen, etc.).
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Figure 1. Foreign exchange reserves. Capturing FX data accurately is notoriously difficult,
as many states consider it a state secret. Further, official reserves often are only partially in
dollars (estimated 60–70%). The data presented here were obtained from a variety of online
sources, including the IMF, US Treasury, and China’s SAFE (State Administration of Foreign
Exchange), and should be mainly used in a qualitative sense. These data should be sufficient
for the purpose intended—simply to show the significant growth in the last few years that in
absolute terms would enable a currency attack. Further, the one datum point shown for GCC
countries includes SWF assets.

Historically, the most effective currency attack arguably occurred during
the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 when, for a variety of reasons, both Britain
and France were interested in taking over the canal and causing problems
for Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser.5 They joined forces with Israel
and attacked Egypt in October 1956. The United States, however, was
against this action and instead pushed for a peaceful resolution to the con
flict. It led a vote in the United Nations demanding withdrawal, and the
New York Federal Reserve Bank began quietly selling pounds. The Soviet
Union also hinted at selling reserves, and Britain’s reserves quickly began
to dwindle. Not only was Britain unable to convince the United States to
cease pressuring the pound, the United States also would not even allow
Britain access to its own reserves on deposit at the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Faced with no good options, Britain agreed to a cease-fire
and the crisis was over. The United States forced Britain to abandon its
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goals in Egypt by attacking its currency, a discreet move that quickly accom
plished its objective. Still, an attack on the dollar would be different, given
the size of the US economy and the dollar’s world reserve currency status.
Yet, the advent of states accruing large dollar reserves may make a currency
attack against the United States a viable tool of economic statecraft.
America’s enemies see dollar vulnerability leading to American decline.
Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez
have repeatedly lobbied OPEC to cease pricing oil in dollars, with Chavez
boasting, “Naturally, by the crash of the dollar, America’s empire will
crash.”6 Former US comptroller general David Walker notes that many
countries with large FX reserves are not allies and could act against US
interests.7 Former treasury secretary Lawrence Summers calls this a “bal
ance of terror,” since both the United States and China could significantly
damage the other by changing the status quo.8
China is often the straw man threat in future-conflict scenarios, with
some foundation. China’s rapid growth, increasing military spending, and
need for strategic resources suggest that it will have the power and poten
tially the appetite for future conflict. Then there is Taiwan. Yet there is
promise that with careful engagement, China could become a construc
tive world leader. Nonetheless, this article focuses primarily on China’s
potential to initiate a currency attack. China has the largest dollar reserves
and is likely to continue as an economic flashpoint as long as global trade
imbalances persist.
The probability of a currency attack on the dollar is low but plausible,
and if not effectively countered, potentially devastating. Further, action
now could minimize the impact. To reach these conclusions, the nature of
a currency attack is reviewed in the next section, to include discussion of
many conflating economic issues (reserve currency status, overvaluation
of the dollar, etc.). Subsequent sections summarize how and why a state
might conduct a currency attack, other large-dollar-holding states’ reac
tions to an attack, and possible actions the United States could take to
minimize the impact.

Fundamentals of a Currency Attack
Taiwanese elections were widely seen as a referendum on indepen
dence, with China threatening “grave consequences” for Taiwan
Strategic Studies Quar terly ♦ Winter 2008
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with any unilateral declaration. In response, the US pre-positioned
two carrier task forces in the region, and quietly told China that any
disagreements must be solved through peaceful negotiation. China
warned the US not to interfere in domestic Chinese issues . . .
A review of currency theory basics will assist in understanding how a
sale of large dollar reserves may harm the United States. The US dollar
has a flexible exchange rate—the government allows market forces to deter
mine the dollar’s value. While the United States rarely intervenes in cur
rency markets, there are limits to a true market price—both internal and
external. Internally, the Federal Reserve must keep one eye on the dollar
in conducting monetary policy; too low a dollar could stoke inflationary
expectations. Externally, the value of a currency is always “against what,”
and competing currencies are often managed carefully.
For example, the dollar’s exchange rate in terms of yen is not a pure
market result since the Japanese government manages the yen’s value in
some trading range to support its export economy. The dollar’s value is
determined primarily by US trade and financial flows, and like any price,
is a function of supply and demand. In the long run, trade flows are the
primary factor in currency valuation.9 While price-level effects explain

With flexible exchange rates, a state’s currency is actively traded against
other currencies in markets to determine its value. A flexible exchange
rate allows a country to have an independent monetary policy. With
fixed (or pegged) exchange rates, a currency’s value is fixed against
some standard (gold, another currency, or a basket of currencies) by
government purchase or sale of its currency. A country must keep suf
ficient reserves to buy its currency if necessary to maintain the peg.
Monetary policy must support the value of the peg and is not inde
pendent. Most previous currency crises occurred when a country’s ex
change rate was fixed but monetary policy supported domestic objec
tives (e.g., to stimulate growth) rather than maintaining the peg. These
conflicting objectives forced the government to exhaust its reserves at
tempting to maintain the official exchange rate. When the reserves are
gone, devaluation is the only option.
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much of long-run currency valuation, other explanatory factors include a
state’s preferences for domestic goods over foreign goods, its trade policies,
and its productivity. In the short run (which may be for several years), a
currency’s value is mainly determined by financial flows, which are driven
by investment rates of return. Theory suggests the only difference between
countries’ interest rates is due to expected changes in the exchange rate
over the time horizon of the investment (for similar risk levels).10 Chang
ing expectations allow long-run factors to come back into play; when trade
policies change or trade balances are different than expected or productivity
jumps or slumps, expectations of the future exchange rate change. In the
short run, therefore, a currency’s value is determined by (1) changes in
interest rate differentials or (2) changes in expected future currency value
(driven by long-term factors).
How the dollar would respond to a fire sale of US assets is related to
its underlying value when attacked. If overvalued, a large sale would
tend to rapidly accelerate the underlying pressures for a new equilibrium
and could result in large swings in the currency’s value. Conversely, an

The law of one price suggests that any identical commodity should
trade at the same price in all locations (after adjustment for transpor
tation and transaction costs) and is the starting point for understand
ing currency valuation. For example, if a Coke costs one dollar in the
United States but only 0.5 euros in Europe, then the exchange rate
should be $2/euro, or €0.5/dollar. If the dollar’s exchange rate actu
ally were $3/euro, there would be an opportunity to profit by buying
Cokes in the United States and shipping them to Europe (abstracting
from shipping and transaction costs). The excess supply of Cokes pro
duced in Europe would only be eliminated when the exchange rate
returned to $2/euro. In the overall economy, this becomes the theory
of purchasing power parity (PPP), which extends the law of one
price to all prices by comparing price levels. Yet, while PPP can be
evoked to partially explain long-term currency values, it is almost use
less as a short-run or day-to-day predictor. See Frederic S. Mishkin,
The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 5th ed.
(Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 171.
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undervalued currency would see significantly less depreciation. Despite
the dollar’s recent sharp fall, the United States may still be vulnerable.
In one noteworthy study of industrialized countries that experienced a
balance-of-payments crisis, the crisis began after the adjustment process
was already underway.11 Even absent any fundamental imbalance, a large
sale of dollar reserves could cause a sharp adjustment.
One interesting stylized fact concerning flexible exchange rates is that
they may stay within some narrow band or trend for long periods of time
and then adjust sharply to a new band or trend. The dollar’s value might
be strong for quite some time, like the early ’80s, and then suddenly
change course, as occurred in the latter ’80s. This lack of smooth adjust
ment suggests the dollar could be fundamentally misvalued for quite a
while, and when the market does correct, it does so dramatically. Rapid
currency changes can cause large adjustments in the real economy as market
participants are forced to adapt. Many currency crashes have occurred sud
denly, even when contemporary theorists had warned that fundamentals
necessitated an exchange rate correction.12 Given the reality of govern
ment intervention in currency markets, it is not surprising to see such
sharp adjustments.13
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Figure 2. Major currency dollar index

As the US current account (CA) exploded to over 6 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2006, many economists concluded the dollar
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was overvalued and needed to depreciate to reach a sustainable CA balance
(commonly thought to be ~3 percent of GDP). Large trade deficits leave
foreigners with more dollars than they might want to hold in their port
folios. As they sell dollars to rebalance their portfolios, the dollar’s value
goes down. How overvalued the currency is depends on the assumptions
made,14 and estimates of required depreciation can vary widely—between
15 and 50 percent in real terms.15 It is not clear yet from the dollar’s large
fall in 2007 whether it will stabilize or go lower, as the effects on trade only
occur with a lag. If the dollar were overvalued, it would exacerbate the ef
fects of a currency attack. Moreover, the recommendations for solving the
current trade imbalances are all appropriate to mitigate risk of and damage
from a currency attack.

The current account, the financial account, and the capital account
make up the balance of payments and sum to zero, by definition. If a
state has a CA deficit, it must have a capital and/or financial account
surplus.
Current Account + Financial Account + Capital Account = 0

In practice, the United States has large CA deficits due to its poor
balance of trade, which is by far the largest component of the current
account.
CA = Balance of Trade + Net Factor Income from Abroad
+ Net Unilateral Transfers

Dollars flow from the United States to purchase foreign-made prod
ucts, such as oil or manufactured goods. The dollars return in the
capital and/or financial account as foreign investors purchase US se
curities and make investments in US assets, keeping the balance of
payments equal to zero.

Some fear a currency attack could precipitate a run on the dollar and
endanger its role as the world’s reserve currency. Several factors enable a
currency to serve as a reserve currency. First, it should be widely used for
Strategic Studies Quar terly ♦ Winter 2008
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exchange of goods and services. Since most states want access to the large
US domestic market, they need dollars to facilitate trade. Second, a re
serve currency should come from a country (or countries) that have deep
and liquid financial markets to provide a safe return on reserves. Finally,
a fiat reserve currency is ideally backed by a government with a history of
protecting its value and a politically independent central bank.
The dollar’s dramatic drop in value since 2002 is seen by some as proof
that its days as a reserve currency are numbered, but one must consider
the long-run perspective and the potential competitors. The most likely
competitor, the euro, has large and deep financial markets and trades with
much of the world. But it is not backed by any government and has no
long history—not even a history to include a full boom/bust cycle where
internal friction over policy could arise. The euro is increasingly a share
of other states’ currency reserves, but that share is still relatively small.16
Further, as long as the United States is a large global trading partner, there
will be demand for dollars to facilitate trade. Finally, many common fears
of loss of reserve currency are overblown—the principle benefit to the
United States is the interest savings associated with seignorage, and that
amount is less than commonly believed.

Seignorage can be thought of as the amount of interest that a govern
ment would have to pay for the amount of currency it has outstanding;
the more physical dollars people are willing to hold, the less T-bills a gov
ernment has to pay interest on. Estimates of the interest savings associ
ated with seignorage are ~ $25 billion per year—no small amount, but in
a $13-trillion economy is less than commonly believed (and, of course,
not all currency is foreign held). So to the extent foreigners are willing to
hold physical US currency, the United States benefits from seignorage.

Contemporary concern over currency attack may be heightened since
most financial crises of the last two decades were currency related. Yet those
countries that suffered a crisis had a currency mismatch—their assets were
denominated in their own currency, but their liabilities were denominated
in others (usually dollars). When these countries had problems, nervous
investors would withdraw their capital in dollars, unless prohibited by
capital controls. Once a country’s reserves were low enough, speculators
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would begin to bet on devaluation, and a crisis would be just a matter of
time. The US situation is radically different, as it has the “exorbitant privi
lege” of borrowing and paying back in its own currency.17

Implementing a Currency Attack
Despite China’s attempt to intimidate Taiwan, voters overwhelmingly
endorsed independence. It was less than a week until intelligence indi
cated China’s missiles were being prepared to launch. When US naval
forces moved in response on Sunday, markets across the world saw
unprecedented selling of US T-bills on Monday . . .
Conceptually a currency attack is easy to understand. If an attacker
holds $100 million in US treasuries, it could sell those in any major fi
nancial market, deposit the cash dollar proceeds in a bank, and exchange
the dollar-denominated bank deposits for bank deposits denominated in
any other currency. Since all prices are determined on the margin, small
changes in the amount sold can result in dramatically varying prices, de
pending upon the elasticity of demand. Even if the demand for dollars is
very elastic, enough dollar sales could cause large swings in value. Indeed,
the threat of dollar sales by a Chinese communist party official in 2007 led
to a sharp drop in the dollar’s value.18
What would be the real effect of a dramatic fall in the value of the dollar?
While Americans are feeling that pain now with higher oil prices, a broader
review shows less effect. Many exporters to the United States are unwilling
to lose market share and will accept smaller profits when the dollar falls. The
Federal Reserve estimates a fairly low pass-though rate of currency deprecia
tion to the inflation rate.19 Furthermore, imports are less than 20 percent
of American GDP, limiting the overall effect. If the dollar’s value were to
remain low longer term, expenditure switching would result in a decrease
of US consumption, while US exports would increase. Also, the first-order
effects of a currency attack may be temporary in nature, especially if the
dollar were fundamentally in balance prior to an attack. The Bank for Inter
national Settlements reports that as of 2007, daily dollar transactions of all
types equaled $2.7 trillion, with cross-border claims equaling $30 trillion
and total financial derivatives at $500 trillion!20
The most plausible scenario for a currency attack to result in significant
negative impact is based on market reaction. Market psychology is diffiStrategic Studies Quar terly ♦ Winter 2008
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cult to predict, but previous market dislocation experience suggests the
reaction could be significant.21 Further, the reaction would be away from
US treasuries, opposite the usual direction. Market participants would set
Expenditure switching occurs when a state whose currency appreci
ates (and imports become relatively cheaper) consumes more imports
and exports less (since its exports cost relatively more). A state whose
currency depreciates will see the opposite effect.

off on a mad scramble for alternative safe liquid assets, and the yen, the
euro, and gold would likely see strong increases in demand. Global eco
nomic concerns would rise, as Europe and Japan would not be in favor of
significantly stronger currencies.22 It would be very possible to see a crash
in world markets, with expensive markets taking the worst hit. The real
fear is if there are contagion effects. Extreme scenarios are possible, similar
to the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in
1998, as a dollar crash is likely not factored into market models. While
growth in global dollar trading somewhat mitigates the possible damage
of a currency attack, some of the largest increase comes in dollar deriva
tives, which are growing 20 percent annually.23 A dislocation in the dollar
market could result in significant losses; it is unclear how sound the
counterparties to derivative contracts are in the wake of unprecedented
losses.24 If they are unable to meet their responsibilities, there is a possibility
of cascading cross-defaults, with consequent market meltdown.
Counterparties is simply the other party opposite a hedge. For example, if
you buy a put option to sell 100 shares of IBM, the person that sold the put
is a counterparty. There is some risk that should you decide to exercise that
option, the individual may not have the resources to purchase your 100
shares of IBM. While there are many protections for simple options, more
complex derivatives have less oversight and more risk—with many times the
leverage employed. Successful hedging of risk is dependent upon the ability
of the counterparty to meet its obligation.
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Potential Attackers—Why They Might Do It
While daily currency trading normally exceeded $3 trillion, the mar
ginal increase of $300B on Monday caused a 5% drop in the value of
the dollar, and interest rates rose a full point in longer-dated maturities.
Rumors began to fly; obviously the Chinese were selling. But would the
GCC countries try to sell in advance of a full-on dollar crisis?
Why would a state ever attack another country’s currency? A broad an
swer is simply that it must believe an attack is the lowest-cost method to
achieve a given objective and that the benefits exceed the cost. So what are
China’s costs to attack the dollar? The most obvious is that if China sold
its dollar assets precipitously, it would receive fire sale returns on its in
vestment and suffer huge losses, which might well harm China more than
the United States. If China considered only profit and loss calculations,
it would never take this action. Although states rationally optimize their
behavior, the leadership of a state will have other considerations than sim
ply maximizing profit. A state will equate marginal political and economic
losses; to suffer a large economic loss associated with initiating a currency
attack, the alternative political cost must be similar.25 What political goal
is worth it to China? Only its leadership would know; perhaps Taiwan?
To understand other costs that China must consider, we must appreci
ate why it has such large dollar reserves. When China began opening up in
the late 1970s, it needed foreign exchange and technology; the preferred
method to acquire these was through foreign direct investment (FDI).26
The Latin American crisis of the early ’80s heavily influenced Chinese
thought; Chinese leadership subsequently demanded that Chinese com
panies balance their FX expenditures with their own FX revenues. Re
peated global currency crises in the ’80s and ’90s showed the value of
having large FX reserves, and China responded with policies that gained
additional reserves. China began its peg to the dollar in 1994, largely in
response to previous inflations that rocked its internal economy. Hong
Kong pegged to the dollar in 1983 with very successful results, so a dollar
peg seemed a natural way to stabilize. At the time, China did not have
large CA surpluses; it was just as likely to import US capital equipment
as to export. While China’s economy grew robustly throughout the 1990s
and subsequently, it was not until 2004 that CA surpluses started amassing
at large rates (along with its dollar reserves). Prior to 2002, the expectation
of currency change for China was in only one direction—depreciation.27
Strategic Studies Quar terly ♦ Winter 2008
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Yet 2003 and 2004 saw marked increases in China’s balance of payment
surpluses (capital account and current account); these surpluses have per
sisted even after the 2005 revaluation of the renminbi against the dollar.
The magnitude of these surpluses ($360 billion in 2007) requires large
intervention by the PBOC on an almost daily basis to maintain the value
of the renminbi.28 As China receives dollars in exchange for its exports,
the industries are required to deposit them with Chinese banks, which
the PBOC then purchases with renminbi. To avoid the inflationary result
of the renminbi, the PBOC raises bank reserve requirements and issues
sterilization bonds to soak up the excess liquidity. China engages in steri
lization to manage its growth as it struggles to shed inefficient state-run
industries without causing mass unemployment that would accompany
the operation of true market forces.29
Nonetheless, the result of this process is not in China’s long-term in
terest. Current policies tend to favor export industries and lead to over
development of export industries at the expense of domestic demand. This



       
:FBS
(%1 

$" 

$"(%1 

Figure 3. China’s current account

limits domestic consumption to a level below where it would normally be
and stimulates export production at a level greater than it should be, lead
ing to suboptimal returns. Paradoxically, this malinvestment could result
in the market determining the renminbi is overvalued, not undervalued!30
Further, sterilization delays the necessary inflation (or real exchange rate
appreciation) China requires, forcing the beleaguered banking system to
hold underperforming assets. Chinese economists lament that China pays
high returns to obtain US FDI while receiving very low returns on its
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US treasury investments.31 Many analysts note this can only continue
as long as the returns on US treasuries exceed what the PBOC must pay
on its sterilization bonds; yet recent US interest rate cuts by the Federal
Reserve have inverted this, forcing the Chinese, in effect, to pay to loan
the United States money (on top of losses associated with dollar depre
ciation)! Since many of the PBOC’s liabilities are non-interest bearing,
it is still profitable on a cash flow basis although its implied capital losses
exceed current interest income.32 Clearly at some point, the Chinese will
be forced to stop this policy.33 China appears to be recognizing the costs
of its current policy; the creation of the China Investment Corporation as
a sovereign wealth fund is an implicit acknowledgement that China has
sufficient reserves and should manage them more efficiently.34 In addi
tion, China requires reserves to deal with the recapitalization of its state-run
banking system, which is known to be saddled with huge loan losses from
state-run industries.35
With this background, we see that China has large dollar reserves (1) as
a buffer against financial crises, (2) as the necessary counterpart to large
current account/capital account surpluses, (3) because of capital controls,
and (4) to facilitate banking system reform.36 All these factors lead China
to favor FDI supporting export industries. Consideration of the costs to
China of a currency attack must include the implications to these objec
tives. First, China would be forced to suspend its dollar peg or suffer the
same whipsaw effect it intended for the United States.37 It is not clear
how markets would respond to this, but it is clear that it would increase
instability—something known to be abhorred by Chinese leadership. Sec
ond, China’s overarching economic goal is to transition employment away
from inefficient state-run industries towards export industries. Economic
conflict with the United States would derail this important objective, as
exports would be reduced (certainly to the United States). Further, a cur
rency attack would almost certainly reduce FDI in China, especially if a
financial contagion developed. Thus, a currency attack would not only
eliminate China’s dollar reserve position at a huge loss, it would also deny
China the “insurance policy” of reserves to protect against crisis—an
economic crisis that might very well occur with a currency attack on
the dollar. Given China’s careful crafting of reserves and how deeply it
abhors internal instability, the probability of a currency attack seems
extremely remote.
Strategic Studies Quar terly ♦ Winter 2008
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Beyond China: Reactions to a Currency Attack
Japan and the UK suffered huge losses in their dollar reserve portfolio.
Japan’s ambassador suggested to the US Treasury secretary that they
could not suffer further losses, and would take whatever action
necessary . . . .
How would other large dollar holders react to a currency attack or the
threat of one? First consider Japan, which has ~$1 trillion in dollardenominated reserves. What would it do? Selling would be very difficult,
as that might precipitate a dollar run and destroy its portfolio’s value.
Would it buy? This is heavily influenced by the dollar’s fundamental value.
Are we in a stable, long-term equilibrium that a currency attack is only
temporarily perturbing? If that were the case, many buyers would appear
to take advantage of artificially low prices. If not, Japan, the UK, and others
would still have an interest in preserving their portfolios’ values; they may
be willing to add to their positions to halt a dollar run.
Other actors to consider include Russia and the GCC countries, which
are not traditional allies and could act in ways that are either stabilizing
or destabilizing. From an economic calculus, they would want to preserve
the value of the foreign exchange; they face the same considerations as
the UK and Japan. However, it may be in their political interest to either
hurt or help the United States when it is down. For instance, Russia has
become increasingly belligerent as its fortunes have risen with commodity
wealth. Dollar hegemony is emblematic of US hegemony in many respects;
an attack on the dollar could reduce American influence worldwide and
thereby further Russia’s own national interest. Russia has already switched
to a reserve basket with euros and dollars; it could certainly change the
percentage in favor of euros at an unhelpful time. While Russia could lose
money with a fire sale approach, two factors mitigate this loss. First, Rus
sia has significantly less dollar reserves than China, so if it sold first Russia
might be able to sell a larger portion before suffering serious capital losses.
Second, Russia does not have China’s level of structural dependency on
the US consumer for its commodity exports.
While initial world reaction would likely blame China for the attack, as
the economic implications began being felt worldwide, the United States
could receive blame for its policies which created the large dollar debt.
Had the United States kept its house in order, so the thinking may go,
this would never have happened. It is possible that anti-American senti
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ment may rise globally, potentially hindering cooperative response to the
crisis. While this analysis is speculative, it nonetheless suggests that any
responses requiring international coordination need to be prepared in ad
vance; it may be more difficult to achieve agreement in the aftermath of
any attack.

Currency Attack Responses
Global stock markets began plunging; rumors suggested several large
funds had engaged in dollar carry trades, and heavily leveraged this bet.
The 10% drop in the dollar was forcing liquidation of assets, including
equities.With the weakness in the dollar and equity markets worldwide,
the Euro shot up over 25% in one day, and Gold went above $3000/oz
for the 1st time. Wednesday saw stock futures down 30% in the US and
more in other global markets. A financial contagion was in work; none
of the quantitative models had assumed this 6-sigma event . . . .
A currency attack is improbable but threatens potentially devastating
results—if the attack is allowed to disrupt financial markets such that a
contagion results. Yet given the large, deep markets in US treasuries, the
United States can develop strategies to minimize the effect of large, simul
taneous dollar sales.38 There are at least three broad strategies to prevent or
mitigate a currency attack, discussed below from the easiest to implement
to the hardest. There is also a common theme; these strategies should be
implemented immediately, as the speed of modern financial markets may
not allow an ad hoc currency attack defense.
Internal US Coordination
First, the US government must prepare for a currency attack, to include
exercising representative scenarios in a revised National Security Council
(NSC) interagency crisis planning process. Scenarios should flesh out co
ordination between the DoD, the Treasury, the intelligence community,
and the Federal Reserve, at a minimum. This coordination should cement
information flow processes as well as war-gaming the specific responses
and timing required to implement. For instance, which financial markets
could be disrupted (locations and types), and which could be used to de
fend? Which agency interfaces with which market? What types of controls
might be effective? Outright market closure (how long?)? Circuit breakers
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(what thresholds?)? How would the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
jointly act?39 Second, scenarios should be developed for differing threat
countries. The internal impact on some attacking states is drastically dif
ferent from others; likewise, the magnitude of the threat. The United
States clearly cannot have a one-size-fits-all currency attack response.
External Coordination
Japan, the EU, the UK, and other large dollar holders have a vested in
terest in helping the United States defeat a currency attack; we should en
ter into formal arrangements to handle “extreme” currency movements.40
Japan will not want the capital value of its dollar holdings destroyed and
will not want the yen to rise appreciably, nor will it want to see China
gain further regional prominence. The EU will not want to see the euro
appreciate significantly and will likely have some concern over Chinese
hostility toward Taiwan. The UK is a traditional ally and a holder of large
amounts of dollar-denominated assets; on both counts it will likely sup
port the United States. Most nations will not find it in their interest to see
the world’s reserve currency in freefall.
US Structural Reforms
The United States should work towards eliminating existing global im
balances, beginning with the orderly adjustment of the dollar to a level
that can be sustained over the longer term. Several factors can assist in this
adjustment. First, the United States does not typically engage in direct
currency manipulation, yet many of its trading partners do. The United
States should engage these partners to end such manipulation. To the ex
tent that markets determine the dollar’s value, the less painful will be the
necessary structural reforms.
The United States must also make other changes to its balance of pay
ments. The US CA deficit is historically high and at levels that have led to
currency crises in other countries (> 5 percent of GDP). While the dollar’s
world reserve currency status has postponed a crisis heretofore, the longer
the United States waits to adjust, the more painful it will be. Existing CA
imbalances are offset by capital and financial account surpluses, as must be
the case in balance-of-payment accounting.41 Foreign central banks have
accumulated large dollar reserves, in part because the United States is
sued vast amounts of debt to finance deficit spending. If the United States
weans off deficit spending, it would eliminate the primary source of dollar
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accumulation and minimize the difficulties to US government operations
should an attack occur. Mitigation of currency attack risk is yet another
sound reason for the United States to get its fiscal house in order.
Further, the United States should implement policies to increase its pri
vate savings rate in addition to increasing public savings. By definition, a
current account deficit must equal the difference between a country’s in
vestment and its national savings (the sum of public and private savings).
If the United States wants to maintain a high level of investment and re
duce its CA deficit, it must increase national savings. The US private sav
ings rate went negative in 2005 and has hovered around zero since. There
are many analyses as to why, including some that suggest that the low
savings rate may not be a problem.42 Without debating the proper meas
urement of the private savings rate or the causes of today’s low rates, one
can still see an obvious truth: if the United States consumes more than it
produces, someone else is making up the difference and is building dollar
reserves that could be used in a currency attack. Both fiscal and monetary
policies should be adjusted to encourage private savings.43

Conclusion
We are now living in the long run. In contrast to the “deficits don’t mat
ter” mantra, run fiscal decisions that sent large dollar debt overseas are
now resulting in major currency adjustments. The dollar’s dramatic fall
since 2002 is manifesting itself in higher prices for food, energy, and other
commodities, and is beginning to correct the global imbalances in trade.
As we live with the long run consequences of our previous fiscal policies,
we must also deal with the national security implications as well. Currency
attacks have historically been an integral part of any war effort. The emer
gence of states holding large dollar reserves suggests, that they could be
factors in the future as well—we must be prepared. If a currency attack is
not countered effectively, it could have a devastating impact on the United
States. Nonetheless, actions can be taken now to minimize the impact,
ensuring that the costs to the attacker would exceed any to the United
States—turning a low probability event into a virtual zero-probability
event.
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